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SIXTH AMENDMENT-THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF JURORS
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
In Ballew v. Georgia,' the Supreme Court held
that a state criminal trial by a jury of only five
persons deprived the accused of the right to trial
by jury guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. The Court found no overriding state
interest sufficient to offset the threat to constitu-
tional guarantees that would result from a reduc-
tion injury size from six to five. Ballew thus estab-
lishes that a constitutionally adequate state crimi-
nal trial jury can be composed of no fewer than six
members.
I
In 1974, Claude Ballew, manager of the Paris
Art Adult Theater in Atlanta, Georgia, was ar-
rested and charged in a two-count misdemeanor
accusation with violating Georgia's obscenity stat-
ute2 by showing the film "Behind the Green Door"
on two separate occasions? Ballew was tried in the
Criminal Court of Fulton County.4 After a jury of
five members had been selected and sworn, 5'Ballew
moved to impanel a jury of twelve persons. He
I435 U.S. 223 (1978). Justice Blackmun wrote the
opinion for the Court. Justice Stevens filed a concurring
statement. Justice White concurred in the judgment.
Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment in which he wasjoined by ChiefJustice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist. Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart and
Justice Marshall concurred in the holding but disagreed
that the petitioner should be subjected to a new trial.
2 Ballew was charged with "distributing obscene ma-
terials in violation of Georgia Code Section 26-2101 in
that the said accused did, knowing the obscene nature
thereof, exhibit a motion picture film entitled 'Behind
the Green Door' that contained obscene and indecent
scenes .... " 435 U.S. at 225.
3 The two count misdemeanor charge was the result of
two showings of different prints of the film.
4 On January 2, 1977, the Criminal Court of Fulton
County was merged with the Civil Court of Fulton
County and is now known as the State Court of Fulton
County. 1976 Ga. Laws, vol. 2, No. 1004, p. 3023.
5 The Criminal Court of Fulton County tried misde-
meanor cases before juries of five persons persuant to GA.
CONsT. art. 6, § 16, 1. codified as GA. CoDE §2.5101
(1973), and to 1890-1891 Ga. Laws, vol. 2, No. 278, pp.
937-38, and 1935 Ga. Laws, No. 38, p. 498. 1890-1891
Ga. Laws, pp. 937-38, states in part:
The proceedings [in the Criminal Court of Atlanta]
after information or accusation, shall conform to
contended that in an obscenity trial, a jury of five
was constitutionally inadequate to assess the con-
temporary standards of the community, and that
the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution6 required a jury of at least six
members in criminal trials. The motion was over-
ruled and the trial proceeded before the five mem-
ber jury which returned a verdict of guilty on each
count.7 After the couzt denied an amended motion
for a new trial," Ballew appealed to the Court of
the rules governing like proceedings in the Superior
Courts, except that the jury in said Court, shall
consist of five, to be stricken alternately by the
defendant and State from a panel of twelve.
Effective March 24, 1976, the number of jurors in the
Criminal Court of Fulton County was changed from five
to six. 1976 Ga. Laws, vol. 2, No. 1003, p. 3019.
Regardless of its size, a Georgiajury in a criminal trial
must reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict. See
Ball v. State, 9 Ga. App. 162, 70 S.E. 888, 889 (1911).
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the assistance of Counsel for
his defense.
The provisions of the sixth amendment as to trial by jury
have been made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states, in pertinent part:
"nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."
U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 provides that:
The trial of all crimes, except in .cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held
in the State where the said crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any
State, the trial shall be at such Place or Places as
the Congress may by Law have directed.
7 Ballew was sentenced to one year imprisonment on
each count and fined $1,000 on each count, the sentences
to run concurrently and to be suspended on payment of
the fines. 435 U.S. at 227.
8 In his amended motion for a new trial, Ballew argued
that the films were illegally seized under a defective
warrant; that the obscenity statute violated the first,
fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution; that the double conviction
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Appeals of the State of Georgia9 where he chal-
lenged his conviction on the grounds, inter alia, that
the use of the five member jury deprived him of
his sixth and fourteenth amendment right to ajury
trial.
The court of appeals 0 rejected the contention
that the five member jury was constitutionally
insufficient.' The court noted that the United
States Supreme Court had not fixed a minimum
number of jurors necessary for a constitutionally
sufficient jury, but had only ruled that a six mem-
ber jury was adequate and above the minimum.
12
The appellate court relied on Sanders v. State13 in
which it had been said that, absent a holding by
the United States Supreme Court that a five mem-
ber jury was constitutionally inadequate, it would
approve the five person jury prescribed by the
Georgia Constitution. The court also relied on
McIntyre v. State4 which, without elaboration, found
that the Georgia statutes pertaining to jury opera-
tion were constitutional. The Supreme Court of
Georgia denied certiorari.
In his petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, Ballew again challenged the con-
stitutionality of the five person jury 5 and the Court
granted certiorari. 16 The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded on the ground that Ballew's trial
before ajury of only five persons had deprived him
of his right to trial by jury guaranteed by the sixth
and fourteenth amendments.
7
had placed him in double jeopardy; that the evidence
was insufficient to suppbrt the verdicts; that the trial
court erroneously excluded testimony of a defense expert
witness; and that the court's instructions on scienter
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense.
435 U.S. at 227 n.6.
9 Ballew v. State, 138 Ga. App. 530, 227 S.E.2d 65
(1976).
0id at 535-36, 227 S.E.2d at 69 (1976).
11 The court of appeals also rejected petitioner's other
contentions. It reviewed the film and found it to be "hard
core pornography" and "obscene as a matter of consti-
tutional law and fact"; it found that the evidence was
sufficient; that the jury instructions correctly explained
the standard of scienter; and that there was no error in
the issuance of the warrants or in the two separate
convictions. Id at 533-34, 227 S.E.2d at 67-69.
12 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
13234 Ga. 586, 216 S.E.2d 838 (1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 93 1.
'4 190 Ga. 872, 11 S.E.2d 5 (1940).
15 He also challenged the constitutional sufficiency of
the jury instructions on scienter and obscenity vel non.
'6429 U.S. 1071 (1977).
17 Since the Court held that the five member jury did
not satisfy the jury trial guarantee of the sixth amend-
Two prior decisions established the foundation
for Ballew. In Duncan v. Louisiana,'8 the Court held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment incorporated' 9 the sixth amendment's
right to trial byjury and made it applicable against
the states. The Court's interpretation of the pur-
pose of the sixth amendment was adopted in sub-
sequent cases which defined the constitutionally
required features of jury trial. Two years after
Duncan, and eight years before Ballew, the Court
held, in Williams v. Florida,2° that a six member jury
was constitutionally sufficient to meet the require-
ments of trial by jury in state criminal cases. In
reaching its conclusion, the Williams Court first
described the way in which ajury must function to
fulfill its purpose. Then, applying this functional
analysis, 2' it defined the features of ajury required
by the Constitution as those necessary for the jury
to serve its purpose. This analysis enabled the
Court to construct the test of constitutionally suf-
ficient jury size which it applied in Williams and
again in Ballew.
In Ballew, the Court was confronted with an
issue that it had avoided in Williams: whether a
further reduction in the size of state criminal trial
juries was constitutionally permissible or whether
such a reduction would impair the functioning of
the jury to a significant degree.22 Writing for the
Court, Justice Blackmuns2 reiterated that the pur-
pose of a jury trial was to provide a safeguard
against governmental oppression by permitting the
"participation of the community in determinations
of guilt and by the application of the common
sense of laymen ... ." The Court then adopted
the Williams test and stated that the Constitution
compelled a jury of sufficient size "to promote
group deliberation, to insulate members from out-
side intimidation, and to provide a representative
cross-section of the community.' 25
ment as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, it did not reach the other issues. Justices
Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, while concurring in the
majority opinion, disagreed that Ballew could be sub-
jected to a new trial on the grounds that the Georgia
obscenity statute was overbroad and therefore facially
unconstitutional. 435 U.S. 228, 246 (1978).
18 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
" The concept of incorporation is discussed in Section
II inira.
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
2' Functional analysis is discussed in Section II infra.
22 435 U.S. at 231.
23 See note 1 supra.
24 435 U.S. at 229.
2 Id. at 230 (citing Williams v. Fla., 379 U.S. 78, 100.
19781
NUMBER OF JURORS
The Court acknowledged that in finding six
member juries constitutionally sufficient in Wil-
liams, it had presumed that reduction in jury size
would not impair jury function or effect the accu-
racy or consistency ofjury verdicts. It then devoted
a substantial portion of its opinion to an analysis
of a body of data developed since Williams26 which
casts doubt on the accuracy, reliability and consis-
tency of results achieved by smaller juries. Based
on this analysis the Court concluded that a further
reduction in jury size would impair, to a constitu-
tional degree, the functioning of the jury.
The empirical data on which the Ballew Court
relied indicated that "smaller juries are less likely
to foster effective group deliberation ... [which
leads at some point] to inaccurate fact finding and
incorrect application of the common sense of the
community ... ,,27 The data showed a significant
correlation between decrease in group size and
decrease in ability to make the critical contribu-
tions necessary for problem solving.as "[M]emory
is important for accurate jury deliberations" and
fewer jury members meant less input about pieces
of evidence or argument.' The studies also indi-
cated that group size correlated positively with the
ability to overcome individual biases and reach
objective results which accurately applied the com-
mon sense of the community to the facts of a case.
Moreover, the variation in verdicts reached by
smaller juries was likely to be detrimental to the
defense 3' because six member panels were less than
half as likely as twelve member panels to result in
hung juries. Significantly fewer minority view-
points would be represented on six member juries
and the likelihood of a minority opinion being
shared by two jurors, thereby increasing the chance
that the minority would adhere to its position and
cause a hung jury, decreased almost 70% on a six
member jury.2 The Court agreed that smaller
juries were also less likely to 'represent minority
groups, thereby reducing meaningful community
participation.33 Retreating from its position in Wil-
liams that six person juries adequately represented
a cross-section of the community, the Court now
2435 U.S. at 231 n.10.
27Id. at 232.
2 Id. at 233 (citing Faust, Group. Versus Individual Problem
Solving, 59J. AB. & Soc. PsYcH. 68, 71 (1959)).
435 U.S. at 233.
30 Id. (citing, among others, Saks, Ignorance of Science Is
No Excuse, 10 TRIAL 18, 77 (Nov.-Dec. 1974)).
3' 435 U.S. at 236.
321d.
33id.
found that the chance for representation dimin-
ished with a decrease in size from twelve to six and
concluded that further reduction in size would
make it even more difficult to achieve representa-
tion.
The Court cited articles critical of the research
methodology of studies which had concluded that
there was only an insignificant difference in the
verdicts reached by juries of six and twelve." It
also reasoned that even if different sized juries
disagreed in only a small percentage of cases, that
percentage would translate into a large number of
cases nationwide. Furthermore, disagreement on
verdicts is more frequent in close cases, the very
cases in which it is of the utmost importance to
have a properly functioning jury to insure accurate
factfinding
3 5
The Court acknowledged that the recent studies
raised "substantial doubt about the reliability and
appropriate representation of panels smaller than
six."' It held that any further reduction in jury
size that "promotes inaccurate and possibly biased
decisionmaking, that causes untoward differences
in verdicts, and that prevents juries from truly
representing their communities, attains constitu-
tional significance." 37 The Court recognized that
the data did not distinguish between the perform-
ance of six and five member juries20 Nevertheless,
the Court created just such a distinction. While it
held that five member juries in state criminal trials
were constitutionally insufficient, it explicitly reaf-
firmed the previous holding in Williams that six
member juries were adequate and avoided reas-




The Court dismissed the contention of the State
that Johnson v. Louisiana4° had approved a five
person jury. It responded that Johnson had merely
considered the narrow question of whether requir-
ing only nine members out of a twelve member
jury to agree in order to convict in a felony case
was a denial of equal protection when unanimity
was required of five member panels used in mis-
demeanor trials. The Court had found that the
classification was not invidious and not a violation
34Id. at 237.




'" 406 U.S. 356.
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of equal protection. However, it did not rule on the
constitutionality of the five member jury.4'
The State argued that because the constitution-
ality of six member juries assessing felony charges
had been affirmed, the use of five member panels
for misdemeanors should be adequate. Rejecting
this reasoning, the Court answered that neither the
purpose nor function of a jury varied with the
importance of a crime.42 Georgia also claimed that
the retention of the unanimity requirement should
preserve the constitutionality of the five member
jury. The Court responded that reaching a unani-
mous verdict did not insure that the jury had
engaged in meaningful deliberation and had cor-
rectly recollected the evidence and arguments.
Therefore, even a unanimous five person jury
would not necessarily serve the defendant's interest
in having the commonsensejudgement of his peers
applied to his case.43
The Court also rejected the argument that a five
member jury would adequately represent the com-
munity if it had been selected without arbitrarily
excluding a particular class. Again relying on the
data, the Court expressed doubt about the ability
of small juries, even if fairly selected, to represent
minority groups and opinions as fully or frequently
as larger panels, and to apply the commonsense
judgement of the community consistently." Fi-
nally, the Court dismissed data cited by the State
to substantiate the position that a decrease in jury
size would not significantly affect jury verdicts.
The Court believed that the conclusions of the
studies had been misinterpreted by the State and
that methodological research problems made the
reliability of the studies questionable.45
The Court then considered whether any signifi-
cant state interests existed which 4ould offset the
threat to the Constitutional guarantee of trial by
jury created by a reduction injury size from six to
five. It found that there were hone. Responding to
the argument that the state's interest in saving time
and money justified smaller juries, the Court relied
on a study which demonstrated that impanelling
smaller juries did not significantly decrease total
trial time.46 It also emphasized that only minimal
41 435 U.S. at 240.2 Only for truly petty offenses is a defendant not
entitled to trial by jury. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66 (1970).
43435 U.S. at 241.
"d. at 241-42.
5 Id. at 242-43
4 "435 U.S. at 244 n.39 (citing Pabst, Statistical Studies
financial savings would result from reducing juries
from six to five members and concluded that these
minimal savings did not justify a further reduction
in jury size. Thus, the Court held that trial on
criminal charges before'a five member jury de-
prived the petitioner of the right to jury trial
guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments.
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion,
agreed that five member juries raised problems of
fundamental fairness. Acknowledging that a line
between five and six was difficult to justify, Powell
took the position that a line had to be drawn
somewhere to preserve the substance of jury trial.
He also emphasized that full incorporation, of the
sixth amendment was unwise, that the features of
federal and state criminal jury trials need not be
identical, and that the guideline should always be
whether the state procedure was fundamentally
fair. Finally, Powell criticized the majority's reli-
ance on statistical data obtained by studies which
he believed had not been scientifically tested within
the framework of the adversary.system.
4 7
II
To understand the reasoning of the Court in
holding that five persons do not comprise a consti-
tu'tionally adequate jury, it is helpful to examine
its reasoning in the past in defining other consti-
tutional requirements of trial by jury. In grappling
with the interpretation of the sixth amendment
and the sixth as incorporated by the tourteenth
amendment, the Court has employed two modes
of analysis. In early cases, it adopted an historical
analysis to ascertain the dimensions and compo-
nents of trial by jury. This approach required
examining the traditional elements of the common
law jury, and deciding which of those elements the
Framers intended to include in the sixth amend-
ment guarantee. More recently, the Court has em-
ployed a functional analysis to determine the com-
ponents of a constitutional jury trial and has re-
pudiated what it had once presumed to be the
dictates of history and tradition. Functional anal-
ysis involves defining the purpose of the right to
trial by jury, determining how ajury must function
to fulfill that purpose, and deciding which substan-
tive and procedural features enable ajury to func-
of the Costs of Six-Man Versus Twelve-Man Juries, 14 WM. &
MARY L. Rav. 326 (1972)).
47 435 U.S. at 246.
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tion as it should. These features then, are required
for a consitutionally sufficient trial by jury.
Taking an historical approach, the Court had
found it easy to conclude that the sixth amendment
mandated a common law jury of twelve members
in federal criminal trials. In Thompson v. Utah,48 the
Court traced the existence of the twelve member
jury to the Magna Carta and the English common
law49 and reasoned that the sixth amendment re-
quired ajury constituted as it was at common law.
The Court noted:
It must consequently be taken that the word "jury"
and the words "trial by jury" were placed in the
Constitution of the United States with reference to
the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in
this country and in England at the time of the
adoption of that instrument ....- 'o
In Maxwell v. Dow' the Court found "no doubt"
that a commonlawjury composed of twelve persons
was prescribed by the sixth amendment.5 2 Again,
in Rasmussen v. United States,'s Justice Harlan wrote
that the constitutional requirement of trial by jury
meant "by the historical, common-law jury of
twelve persons."54 And, twenty-six years later in
48 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
49 "The law of England hath afforded the best method
of trial, that is possible, ... namely, by a jury of twelve
men all concurring in the same judgment" Id. at 350
(quoting I HALE'S P.C. 33).
170 U.S. at 350.
5' 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
52 Id. at 586. Maxwell held that the sixth amendment
guarantees were not limits on the powers of the states
and that the right to a trial by ajury of twelve as required
by the sixth amendment was not a privilege and immu-
nity protected by the fourteenth amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to
secure to all persons in the United States the benefit
of the same laws and remedies. Great diversities
may exist in two states separated only by an
imaginery line. On one side of this line there may
be a right to a trial by jury, and on the other side
no such right.
Id. at 599.
It appears to us that ... whether a trial in criminal
cases not capital shall be by a jury composed of
eight instead of twelve jurors. ... [is] eminently
proper to be determined by the citizens of each
State for themselves, and does not come within the
clause of the amendment .... It is emphatically the
case of the people by their own organic law, provid-
ing for their own affairs, and we are of the opinion
they are much better judges of what they ought to
have in these respects than anyone else can be.
Id. at 604.
Maxwell was repudiated in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968), which held the sixth amendment right
to trial by jury applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
5 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
54 Id. at 529 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Patton v. United States,s5 relying on history and tra-
dition, the Court held that a "constitutional jury
means twelve men as though that number had
been specifically named." 6
More complex problems arose when the Court
applied the sixth amendment to the states through
the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Duncan v. Louisiana,5 7 the Court held that
the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee
incorporated the sixth amendment's right to trial
by jury and made it enforceable against the states.
In reaching its conclusion, the Duncan Court used
both historical and functional analysis. First, it
outlined the history of trial by jury in criminal
cases and found "impressive support" for consid-
ering the right fundamental to our system of jus-
tice.s
The Court then analyzed the purpose of trial by
jury. It concluded thit the framers had intended
to protect against government oppression and ar-
bitrary action by thejudiciary. The option of being
judged by peers who would apply the common
sense of the community to the facts of the case
provided "an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased or eccentric judge."5 9 Given this
purpose, the Court had no difficulty finding again
that the general grant of jury trial for serious
offenses6° was a fundamental right which must be
respected by the states. It held, therefore, that the
fourteenth amendment guaranteed the right to a
jury trial in all criminal cases which, if tried in




Duncan is important for several reasons. First, in
each subsequent case in this area, the Court has
adopted Duncan's definition of the purpose of jury
trial.62 Second, in concurring and dissenting opin-
5 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
56Id. at 292.
57 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Sid. at 153.
59 Id. at 156.
60 The Court found that a crime carrying a possible
maximum penalty of two years was a serious crime
subjecting the trial to the sixth amendment guarantees.
61 In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the
Court held that the fourteenth amendment right to trial
by jury attaches where the sentence could exceed six
months imprisonment. Since both the federal system and
the vast majority of the states allowed jury trial for crimes
punishable by imprisonment for longer than six months,
the Court was willing to adopt this "near uniform judg-
ment of the nation" as the objective criterion for defining
serious crimes. The Court rejected the argument that a
distinction could be made between felony and misde-
meanor trials.
62 See, e.g., notes 74-90 and accompanying text infra
[Vol. 69
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ions, the Justices argued the merits of selective
incorporation and Federalism and assumed posi-
tiors which have been represented reasonably con-
sistently in cases specifying requirements of a con-
stitutionally adequate state criminal jury trial.63
Selective incorporation is the absorbtion into the
fourteenth amendment of selected Bill of Rights
provisions which the Court finds are mandated by
the guarantee of due process of law. These provi-
sions, once incorporated in the fourteenth amend-
ment, are then enforceable against the states. The
incorporated guarantees are often those which the
Court determines are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty or fundamental to our system of
justice.4 Several positions on selective incorpora-
tion were articulated in Duncan. Some Justices
asserted that a Bill of Rights guarantee, once ab-
sorbed into the fourteenth amendment, imposed
identical standards on the state and federal govern-
ment so that the same features were required to
protect individual rights against state as against
federal encroachment. This position was repre-
sented by Justices Black and Douglas in a concur-
ring opinion in Duncan.6 They agreed with the
majority that th; fourteenth amendment absorbed
the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury.
Furthermore, they contended, state courts should
apply the same standards for the Bill of Rights as
are applied in federal courts. Rejecting the argu-
ment that this would interfere with state experi-
mentation with criminal justice systems, they rea-
soned that the states should not be allowed to
experiment with protections afforded by the Bill of
Rights 
6
A second position was that a Bill of Rights
guarantee, once incorporated, might have different
meanings and requirements as applied to the state
and federal government; that the substance of a
particular guarantee could be made applicable to
the states without imposing all of the requirements
(discussing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)), and
notes 91-98 and accompanying text infia (discussing
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)).
'The Court has frequently used the incorporation
doctrine to make selected Bill of Rights guarantees ap-
plicable to the states. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964) (applying the fifth amendment right to be free
of compelled self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainright,
372 US. 335 (1963) (applying the sixth amendment right
to counsel); and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(applying the fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures and to have illegally
seized evidence excluded from criminal trials).
" 391 US. at 148, 149 & n-14.
'srd. at 162 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
6Id. at 170.
applicable within the federal system. This position
was articulated by Justice Fortas, who concurred
in the holding in Duncan, but who objected to the
implication of the majority opinion that incorpo-
rating the sixth amendment required that all of the
ancillary rules which the Court had developed
incidentsl to the right to trial by jury must auto-
matically be applied to the states.67 Arguing
against "slavish adherence" to the incorporation
theory' Fortas asserted that even if the right to
jury trial was fundamental and applicable against
the states, the particulars accorded that right need
not be uniform. In keeping with the principles of
federalism, states should be given maximum lati-
tude to experiment with variations that would not
impair the purpose of jury trial. Fortas claimed
that the substance of the sixth amendment guar-
antee could be absorbed by the fourteenth amend-
ment without all of its "bag and baggage, however
securely affixed they may be by law and precedent
to federal proceedings."'69
A third position was articulated by Justices who
opposed incorporation altogether. These Justices
argued that the Court should consider each case in
light of whether the state procedure involved was
fundamentally fair and thus complied with the
fourteenth amendment due process guarantees.
This position was advocated by Justice Harlan in
his dissent in Duncan."0 Harlan argued that due
process did not require imposing federal rules on
the states except when essential to fundamental
fairness. Because he did not believe that trial by
jury was the only fair means of resolving issues of
fact, he would have had the Court consider, in
each case, whether the state trial process was a fair
one. Harlan's objection to incorporating the sixth
amendment was that it would require imposing on
the states only one means of trying criminal cases,
thus putting the states in a federal constitutional
"straightjacket." 7' This, Harlan argued, was incon-
sistent -with the principles of federalism, which
command that the states be permitted to control
the "machinery of criminal justice within their
borders "' and have maximum room to experiment
67Justice Fortas' concurrence in Duncan can be found
after Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 211 (1968).
'5391 U.S. at 213.
6rd. Justice Fortas specifically mentioned that the
Duncan decision should not be presumed to impose the
federal requirements ofjury unanimity orjury size on the
states since it was possible to conclude that these features
of federal jury trials were not fundamental and were not
essential to due process of law.
'Justie Stewart joined Justice Harlan in dissent.




as long as they provide machinery which is fun-
damentally fair. 73
The Justices maintained these positions on in-
corporation in Williams v. Florida,74 the case in
which the Court laid the foundation for its decision
in Ballew. In Williams, the Court held that a six
memberjury was constitutionally adequate to meet
the requirements of trial by jury in state criminal
trials. The majority purportedly relied on Duncan's
incorporation of the sixth amendment into the
fourteenth via the due process clause and then
squarely rejected earlier decisions in which it had
held that twelve jurors were required for a consti-
tutional trial by jury. Justice White75 delivered the
opinion in which the Court repudiated history and
tradition as a mandate for establishing jury size.
The Court examined the history of the jury system
and asserted that a panel of twelve members was
"without significance," the result of "historical ac-
cident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave
rise to the jury in the first place, an accidental
feature" 76 which, despite precedent, ought not to
be "immutably codified into our constitution.,
77
"To read the Sixth Amendment as forever codify-
ing a feature so incidental to the purpose of the
Amendment is to ascribe blind formalism to the
Framers for which there is little evidence in the
history or language of the Constitution.'
78
The Court asserted that the intent of the Framers
supported its position and cast "doubt on the easy
assumption ... that if a given feature existed in a
jury at common law in 1789, then it was necessarily
preserved in the Constitution." 79 Concluding that
the Framers had no explicit intent to equate the
"The Court adopted a functional approach in pro-
hibiting discrimination in the selection of juries. Carter
v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) and Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). The Court reasoned that in
order to fulfill its purpose as defined in Duncan, the jury
must be a body truly representative of the community
The principle that to function properly a jury must
reasonably reflect a cross section of the community was
applied later when the Court assessed whether juries
smaller than 12 could function so as to fulfill their
constitutional purpose.
74 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
7s Justice Blackmun did not take part in considering
this case. ChiefJustice Burger, Justice Harlan andJustice
Stewart, and Justice Black and Justice Douglas wrote
separate concurring opinions. Justice Marshall dissented
on the issue ofjury size.
76 399 U.S. at 89.
7Id. at 90.
78 id.
79 Id. at 92.
constitutional and commonlaw characteristics of
the jury, the Court was free to look at other than
historical considerations. White's majority opinion
clearly reflected the assumption that functional
analysis was a more suitable approach to the ques-
tion of jury size, and that the relevant issue ought
to be what size panel was necessary in order for the
jury to fulfill its constitutional purpose.
Establishing the foundation for a functional
analysis, the Williams Court adopted the view ex-
pressed in Duncan that the purpose of trial by jury
was to prevent oppression by the government. The
jury achieved its purpose by providing the com-
mon-sense judgement of a group of laymen through
the "community participation and shared respon-
sibility that results from that group's determination
of guilt or innocence." Concluding that perform-
ance of this jury function was not contingent on
the fact that the jury consisted of twelve members,
the Court formulated a test of constitutionally
acceptable size-a size which would permit the
jury to perform its function. Ajury should be large
enough to promote "group deliberation, free from
outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a
fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-
section of the community."'" The Court made
casual reference to a few social science "experi-
ments" which ostensibly supported the position
that performance of these functions would be un-
affected by decreasing jury size from twelve to six.
It asserted that there would be no discernible dif-
ference in the results reached by six and twelve
member panels, that the reliability of verdicts
would not be diminished, that a reduction in size
would not threaten the exclusion of any class from
representation,s2 and that the decrease would favor
neither the defense nor the prosecution as there
would be no significant difference in the number
of "hungjuries." Believing that a reduction injury
size would lead to no ill effects, the Court con-
cluded that it was desireable to leave decisions
about jury size to state legislatures "unrestrained
by an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment that







2 The Court reasoned that there was no guarantee
that every opinion in the community would be repre-
sented even on the 12 memberjury, so that as long as a
class was not arbitrarily excluded the decrease injury size
should not create concern about representation.
m 399 U.S. at 103.
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Justices Black and Douglas concurred with this
portion of the Williams opinion.8s They maintained
that the decision posed no conflict with their pre-
vious position that specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights which had been incorporated by the four-
teenth amendment applied to state courts the same
standards as applied to federal courts. Rather, prior
decisions which had held that the sixth amendment
required a jury of twelve members were based on
improper constitutional interpretation which was
now being reexamined and rejected. Therefore, the
Williams decision did not dilute the sixth amend-
ment guarantees because the sixth amendment was
being reinterpreted. The import of this opinion is
that the twelve member jury may be required by
federal rules, but is not mandated by the Consti-
tution.85
Justice Harlan also concurred in the Court's
holding but took the opportunity to attack the
incorporation doctrine and reiterate the principles
underlying his dissent in Duncan.86 He argued that
the Court in Williams, by refusing to apply the
traditional sixth amendment requirements to state
proceedings, had compromised the incorporation
doctrine. He considered this an illustration of the
problem inherent in' incorporation: either states
with differing law enforcement problems would
find themselves encumbered by requirements de-
veloped within the context of the federal system,
or the Court would have to relax federal standards.
He anticipated that this alternative would dilute
Bill of Rights guarantees applicable against the
federal government so that the states would have
leeway in establishing criminal justice systems
suited to their individual needs. Harlan saw Wil-
liams as the Court's effort to temper its position on
incorporation in order to "wriggle free of [the]
straightjacket"87 which restricted state diversity.
He viewed it as evidence of the discomfort of the
Court with the tension between the "jurispruden-
tial consequences wrought by incorporation ...
and the counter-pulls of the situation in Williams
which presents the prospect of invalidating the
common practice in the states of providing less
than a 12-member jury for the trials of misde-
meanor cases.
' s
1 Id at 106 (Black and Douglas; J.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
"Id. at 107.
86 Id. at 117 (larlan, J., concurring).
8Id. at 130.
" Id. at 129.
He further stated that:
Today's decisions demonstrate a constitutional schiz-
ophrenia born of the need to cope with national
diversity under the constraints of the incorporation
doctrine ... . [1In Williams the Court seeks out a
minimum standard to avoid causing disruption in
numerous instances even though, a priori, incorpo-
ration would surely require a jury of 12.s
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that
the fourteenth amendment guaranteed to state
defendants the same trial by jury as guaranteed to
federal defendants by the sixth amendment which
the Court had long ago established required ajury
of twelve.9°
The functional analysis employed in Williams
was adopted in subsequent cases in which the
Court held that state criminal trial juries were not
required to reach a unanimous verdict in order to
convict. In Apodaca v. Oregon,9 1 a five member ma-
jority92 held that conviction by ten members out of
89 Id. at 136. Justice Stewart, dissenting, agreed with
Harlan, taking issue with the incorporation doctrine
which he felt compelled the Court "either to impose
intolerable restrictions upon the constitutional sover-
eignty of the individual states in the administration of
their own criminal law or else intolerably to relax the
explicit restrictions that the Framers actually did put
upon the Federal government in the administration of
criminal justice." 399 U.S. at 143 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring).
90 399 U.S. at 117 (Marshal, J., dissenting).
Following Williams, the Court approved Federal juries
of six in civil trials in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149
(1973), holding that a six member jury comported with
Seventh Amendment requirements. The case is not rele-
vant to this discussion since it dealt with the seventh
rather than the sixth amendment, and the history and
purpose of the seventh amendment is substantially dif-
ferent from that of the sixth. However, it is interesting to
note that in reaching its conclusion, the Court engaged
in a detailed historical analysis and then turned to func-
tional analysis to determine whether jury performance in
fulfilling the purpose of trial by jury in civil cases was a
function of size. Justice Marshall and Stewart, in dissent,
criticized the Court's use of functional analysis and ar-
gued "[tjhe line must be drawn somewhere, and the
difference between drawing it in light of history and
drawing it on an ad hoc basis is, ultimately, the difference
between interpreting a Constitution and making it up as
one goes along." Id. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
They were equally critical of the Court's rejection of
historical mandate in Williams. This perspective, that
when arbitrary lines must be drawn by the Court history
and tradition may be the best guides, is examined at
notes 107-12 and accompanying text infra.
9' 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
92justice White announced the opinion of the Court
in which Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and
Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Powell wrote a separate
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twelve in a state criminal trial did not violate the
right to trial by jury guaranteed by the sixth
amendment as applicable to the states through the
fourteenth. After reexamining the history of the
sixth amendment the Court concluded that the
intent of the framers regarding the requirement of
jury unanimity was ambiguous. The Court then
utilized a functional analysis and concluded that
requiring unanimity did not materially contribute
to the ability of the jury to apply the common-
sense judgement of the community. Moreover, the
Court asserted that the ability of the jury to rep-
resent a cross section of the community and "delib-
erate, free from outside attempts at intimidation"
' gs
would not be impaired by permitting a verdict of
ten to tw6. Thus, the Court concluded that the
functions of the jury would not be disturbed by
allowing non-unanimous juries to convict.9
Justice Powell's concurrence in Apodaca illus-
trates both the functional approach and the incor-
poration position advocated by Justice Fortas in
Duncan.95 Powell felt that the "safeguarding" func-
tion of the jury was adequately preserved by a nine
vote majority and found "no reason to believe, on
the basis of experience.., that a unanimous deci-
sion of 12 jurors is more likely to serve the high
purpose ofjury trial ..... ,96 Moreover, in "defining
the elements of the right to jury trial there is no
sound basis for interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment to require blind adherence by the
opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Douglas,
Brennan, Marshall and Stewart each wrote separate
dissenting opinions.
93 406 U.S. at 413.
94johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) was de-
cided by the Court on the same day as Apodaca. The issue
in Johnson was the constitutionality of a conviction by a
jury vote of nine to three. BecauseJohnson was tried by
the lower court before the Supreme Court reached its
decision in Duncan, the question was whether the four-
teenth amendment due process guarantee required a
unanimous verdict, whereas in Apodaca the Court was
considering whether the sixth amendment as incorpo-
rated into the fourteenth required jury unanimity. The
Court divided infJohnson exactly as it did in Apodaca. A
five justice majority held that jury unanimity was not
required by the due process clause. The majority con-
cluded that neither the accuracy nor integrity of a guilty
verdict was undermined by three dissenting votes on a
twelve member jury and therefore unanimity was not
necessary in order that a trial be fundamentally fair.
One of the significant issues in both Apodaca and
Johnson was how a defendant could be found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury when two or three
jurors remained convinced of his innocence. The issue,
however, is not relevant to this discussion.
95 justice Powell's opinion appears as his concurrence
in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972).
9Id. at 374.
States to all the details of the federal Sixth Amend-
ment standards."9' Therefore, states should be
given the freedom to experiment with adjudicatory
processes. 98
III
The decisions of the Court in Williams and Apo-
daca generated a substantial body of literature crit-
ical of a decrease in jury size from twelve to six.
The reliance by the Court on functional analysis
seemed to necessitate scientific appraisal of its as-
sumptions about the operational impact of jury
size. Numerous studies sought to determine if the
ability of a jury to resolve questions of guilt reli-
ably, consistently and accurately was impaired by
a decrease in size.99 Applying the Williams test, if
the ability of the group to deliberate, to be free
from outside intimidation, or to represent a fair
cross-section of the community, was negatively af-
fected, then the smaller jury would not fulfill its
constitutional purpose as well as the larger jury.
Studies demonstrating such impairment would
suggest that Williams rested on incorrect analysis
and its holding would be threatened.
In Ballew the Court acknowledged that the re-
cent studies raised substantial doubts about the
"wisdom and constitutionality of a reduction [in
jury size] below six."' But the Court could not
identify, within those studies, a finite line below
which the number of jurors would not be able to
9
7 Id. at 375.
98 Justice Douglas, in dissent, also adopted a functional
perspective, but argued that a less than unanimous re-
quirement diminished the reliability of ajury verdict and
resulted in fewer hung juries thereby favoring the State.
The diminution in jury size approved in Williams, on the
other hand, was neither more nor less advantageous to
the state. 406 U.S. 389-90 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Douglas' dissent in Apodaca appears in Johnson v.
Louisiana, id. at 358.
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart, dissenting in
Johnson and Apodaca also argued that the sixth amendment
had identical application against both the state and
federal governments. Marshall and Brennan argued that
the requirement that juries be drawn from a cross section
of the community would be negatively affected by allow-
ing less than unanimous verdicts, since minority views
could be ignored. 406 U.S. at 402 (Marshall and Brennan,
JJ., dissenting.) Their reasoning is another example of
functional analysis. Marshall argued against functional
analysis and asserted that history, the appropriate guide,
compelled finding that unanimity was an essential fea-
ture of a constitutional jury decision. Marshall feared
that functional analysis had allowed the majority to strip
away many of the characteristic features once guaranteed
by jury trial. 406 U.S. at 355 (Marshall and Brennan, J.
J., dissenting).
99435 U.S. at 230, 231 n.12.
'0 Id. at 232.
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function as required by Williams.10 1 Moreover, the
Court recognized that the studies consistently and
overwhelmingly found that twelve member juries
did a significantly better job of decision making
than six member panels, and that six member
juries did not perform nearly as adequately in
fulfilling the functions specified in Williams. Since
the data cast equal doubt on the ability of a jury
of six and a jury of five to pass the Williams test, it
is intriguing that the Court relied on the data in
Ballew to find five member juries inadequate while
leaving Williams, which held that six memberjuries
were constitutionally adequate, intact.
Apparently, at the time that Williams was de-
cided, there was not a sufficiently large body of
evidence on the effect of jury size to overcome the
presumption that the states should have the power
to experiment and decide how large ajury must be
to function adequately. The logic of Ballew, how-
ever, rested on evidence which unquestionably es-
tablished that, applying the Court's test, five is not
large enough, and there is considerable doubt
about the wisdom of the Court's refusal to apply
the same logic to a reconsideration of Williams. The
Court's own logic in 'Ballew demonstrated that
Williams rested on a faulty foundation.
Williams specified that reducing jury size would
be unconstitutional if smaller size impaired per-
formance. Because the Court found in Ballew that
a decrease in size from twelve to six produced more
varied verdicts, less accuracy, less reliability, and
diminished[ representativeness, and permitted
fewer holders of minority opinions to prevail re-
sulting in fewer hung juries, (in other words, that
six and twelve member juries perform quite differ-
ently), it could just as well have found that six
memberjuries were as constitutionally inadequate
as five member panels. If the proponents of smaller
juries in Williams had subjected the functioning of
the six member jury to their own test to show that
change in size would be unlikely to affect the
average quality of jury justice, then they clearly
would not have prevailed'02 given the data on
which the Court relied in Ballew. It is interesting
that the Court was so uninhibited by its own logic.
The six member jury fails the Court's own test by
the Court's own reasoning-the correct application
of the test would find six as unacceptable as five.
'o' The Court cited Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling to
Deteine Optin Juy Size Required to Convict, 1975 WASH.
U.LQ. 933, for the proposition that optimum jury size
was between six and eight but the Court does not purport
to rely on this study to draw the line at six.
'2 Lempert, Uncovering 'Nondiscermible" Differences: Em-
pbkria! Researrh and tLiJeay-Size Cases, 73 MicH. L. REv.
643, 69 (1975).
There is little left of the Court's opinion in
Williams after its analysis in Ballew. If Williams is
to stand, the burden should be on the Court to
make a meaningful distinction between the per-
formance of six and five member panels and to
demonstrate that ajury of six does not threaten the
interests that the sixth amendment was designed
to protect.
One interpretation of Ballew is that it reflects the
embarrassment of the Court at having relied on a
premise which was so quickly and unequivocally
proven false' °3 Perhaps, then, Ballew is merely an
effort to minimize the damage already done. If so,
it is curious that the Court felt compelled to reaf-
firm Williams explicitly when it was only required
to decide the narrow issue of the constitutionality
of the five member jury, a context in which it was
arguably inappropriate to overrule Williams. Pos-
sibly the Court was trying to buy time and to give
itself breathing room before finding another Wil-
liams on its docket.
The embarrassing position in which the Court
found itself in Ballew resulted from its attempt to
resolve the issue of jury size within the rubric of
functional analysis. It may be that it is simply not
appropriate to use functional analysis to determine
constitutionally acceptable jury size. To say that
constitutionally acceptable jury size is the size nec-
essary to fulfill certain functions requires quanti-
fying certain concepts which invariably resist
quantification. How much representation is
enough? How much group deliberation is enough?
The impulse to rely on social science to provide
answers is irresistable-and that, of course, is what
the Court has done. But this approach raises more
questions than it answers. Social science data and
conclusions are subject to frequent change. Is it
appropriate for constitutional interpretation to be
based on statistical studies, the conclusions of
which are certain to change as methodologies are
refined and new data is produced? How rapidly
ought the law to shift to reflect the new realities
social science reveals? If the law is too much a
handservant of such data, then it will be in a
constant state of flux and create- the very uncer-
tainties it is designed to circumvent.1° The results
of relying on data are apparent in Williams and
Ballew: the studies which "supported" the premise
of Williams that a diminution in jury size would
1on Discussion with Frank Wiggins, formher Associate
Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of
Law.
'
04 Frank Wiggins, former Associate Professor of Law,
Northwestern University School of Law.
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not impair jury function were substantially dis-
credited in the interim between Williams and Bat-
lew.
Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, in their joint concurrence in Ballew,
recognized the problem implicit in relying on social
science data and criticized the majority's reliance
on "numerology derived from statistical studies."
10 5
It has been said that constitutional rights should
not rest on scientific demonstrations.' 6 Even
though jury size is more a procedural than a sub-
stantive right, the question remains: how should
the Court choose a number?
One can argue that history and tradition pro-
duce a more certain standard than social science
data. Justice Harlan admonished the Williams
Court for "stripping off the livery of history from
the jury trial.' ' 10 7 He argued that the Court had
not produced an acceptable reason for disregarding
history, a "wellspring of constitutional interpreta-
tion,"'8 and continued:
The Court's elaboration of what is required [for a
constitutionally adequatejury] provides no standard
and vexes the meaning of the right to ajury trial in
federal courts, as well as state courts, by uncertainty.
Can it be doubted that a unanimous jury of 12
provides a greater safeguard than a majority vote of
six? The uncertainty that will henceforth plague the
meaning of trial by jury is itself a further sufficient
reason for not hoisting the anchor to history.' 9
Even if twelve was an arbitrary number, an histor-
ical accident, "history ... might have embodied
more wisdom than the Court would allow."1
' 0
Since one function of the jury is to represent the
community as broadly as possible and since the
jury must remain a manageable size, conceivably,
after centuries of trial and error, the common law
jury came to be fixed at twelve as a number
maximizing these two goals."'
Nevertheless, since the Court has rejected the
mandates of history and tradition as an answer to
the question of constitutionally required jury size,
and since there is no apparent reason why research
data should be the standard for drawing the line
't5 435 U.S. at 246. (Powell, J., Burger, C. J., and
Rehnquist, J., concurring).
"06 Lempert, supra note 102, at 705.
(r 399 U.S. at 122 (Harlan, J., concurring).1 uId. at 124.
l Id. at 126.
"o Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution
oftheJury, 38 U. COH. L. REV. 710, 712 (1971).
". Id. at 712.
at five, is there anyjustification, except the Justices'
own casual explanation that a line must be drawn
somewhere, for drawing the line between five and
six? One factor which should be reconsidered is the
interest of the state. In Ballew, the Court deter-
mined that states use smaller juries to save time
and money. While the time saved was found to be
negligible, and the dollars saved by providing a
jury of five rather than six were minimal, the Court
recognized that the financial benefits of a reduction
from twelve to six could be substantial. Perhaps
the cost benefits to the state prevail when the
reduction is from twelve to six , but not when it is
from six to five.
Do Williams and Ballew reflect the current posi-
tion of the majority of the Court on selective
incorporation? The Court still, apparently, believes
that the fourteenth amendment has incorporated
the sixth. Thus, it is unlikely that the Ballew Court
is adopting Harlan's position and rejecting incor-
poration, although its analysis indicates that five
member juries present problems of fundamental
fairness and violate the due process guarantee of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court is, indeed,
giving the states "wriggling room" to the point at
which it believes the criminal justice system can no
longer be considered fair.
If Williams is actually a reinterpretation of the
mandates of the sixth amendment, then it is not
clear that the majority of the Court has rejected an
approach which would bind state courts to the
same standards as federal courts. What seems most
likely, however, is that the Ballew Court has
adopted the less intrusive incorporation approach
advocated previously by Justice Powell and Justice
Fortas. Indeed, this is the position maintained in
Ballew by Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist. They concurred in Ballew on
the ground that five member juries involve "grave
questions of fairness" 112 but emphazised that not
every feature of jury trial practice must be the
same in federal and state courts in order for the
substance of the sixth amendment to be incorpo-
rated and made applicable against the states. The
Court seems to be saying that, in regard to trial by
jury, the Constitution provides certain constraints
on state activity, but that states are to be held to
less strict judicial oversight than federal courts, in
keeping with the principles of federalism. The Con-
112 435 U.S. at 245 (Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., and
Burger, C. J., concurring).
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stitution will, apparently, tolerate experimentation
down to six, after which a trial is likely to violate
the guarantee of fundamental fairness. This expla-
nation provides a rationale which more or less
permits Ballew and Williams to coexist. The prob-
lem is, however, that there is still no explanation of
why five is more fundamentally unfair than six,
and the answer is not to be found in the data which
the Ballew Court examined so thoroughly.
As yet unanswered is whether a non-unanimous
verdict by a jury 'of six in a state criminal trial is
constitutionally acceptable. A majority of the
Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that nei-
ther Ballew nor Williams forbids conviction by a
five to one majority. 13 A question for the Court in
the future is likely to be whether the values which
Ballew found inadequately served by a five member
jury are preserved by the non-unanimous verdict
of a six member panel.
"' State v. Wrestle, 360 So. 2d 831 (La. 1978).
1978]
